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A woman, lost in an unfamiliar neighborhood, stops a man on the
street and asks him for directions.' He jots them down on a note, but
when she follows the directions to the destination, he reappears by
surprise and then rapes and robs her. Police apprehend a suspect, and
obtain from him a writing sample that replicates the writing on the note.
Later, in the course of preparing for trial, the defense attorney asks the
court to order the crime scene note turned over for independent
examination by a handwriting analyst. When the defense expert
concludes that the defendant is the probable author, the defense decides
not to present the expert's testimony, but nevertheless attacks the
reliability of the government expert's analysis at trial.
At this point, consider a range of scenarios that the government
could undertake. It could:
* Elicit only evidence from its own expert that the defendant
authored the note, and nothing further;
" Elicit evidence from its expert that nothing in the testing
process disturbed the note, and so it remained available to
the defense to conduct its own independent tests;
" Elicit evidence as above, adding that the defense did actually
request and receive the note for the purpose of independent
examination;
" Elicit evidence as above, only also call attention to the fact
that the defendant's expert was not called at trial;
" Elicit evidence as above, only also request an express
inference that the failure to call the witness suggests that the
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testimony was hostile to the defendant's interest;
" Obtain an order precluding defense cross-examination
altogether as lacking a basis, since the defense cannot
produce any evidence in support of its contention that the
government expert's conclusions are faulty;
" Issue a subpoena to the defense expert and call her to testify
in its case in chief as to her conclusions;
" Issue a subpoena and call the defense expert, particularly
eliciting evidence that the expert was chosen by and
conducted the inquiry at the request of the defense, thereby
bolstering the credibility of the expert and of the
government's own conclusions.
What if the contested evidence was not a handwriting sample, but a
DNA swab, or an available and demonstrably reliable fMRI test 2-
should that change the analysis? Suppose the government in a rape case
fails to conduct DNA testing of semen collected from a rape kit
performed on the victim, due to lack of time or resources or mere
initiative. When the defendant attacks the government's failure to test
the evidence as grounds for acquittal, should the prosecutor be able to
respond that the defense declined to test it as well, and expressly or
implicitly suggest that the defendant must have therefore known that any
such tests would be unfavorable? Should it matter whether the defense
had an explicit right to conduct independent testing, but had not
exercised it? Or whether an indigent defendant had requested funds to
conduct independent testing, but had been denied? Or whether the tests
in question were particularly costly, or time consuming? Should it matter
whether the defendant's basis for attacking the government's results
relies on a methodological complaint about the legitimacy of a forensic
technique overall, or simply the manner in which the testing was
executed in the particular case? In short, where physical evidence is
available for testing in a criminal case, what are the boundaries of
permissible argument for both the prosecution and defense?
Physical evidence is not a new phenomenon, and the presence of
items amenable to scientific testing has long raised a host of complicated
evidentiary and procedural questions for the legal system. Nowhere is
this more true, or are partisan allegiances more pronounced, than in the
criminal justice system? Despite its origins in the supposedly neutral
discipline of science, it is well documented that forensic evidence is
2. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 390-405 (2007) (discussing functional magnetic resonance
imaging, or fMRI, including the start-up company "No Lie MRI," which claims "near-perfect"
accuracy in "truth verification and lie detection").
3. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation
of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 744-74 (2OO7).
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vehemently territorial.4 But although lines have long been drawn in the
field of forensic science, the emergence of a "second generation"' of
scientific evidence has changed the terms of battle.
These kinds of procedural and evidentiary questions have become
particularly common, and particularly salient, as second generation
forensic evidence assumes an increasingly important role in the criminal
6justice system. The reasons may be manifold. It may be that such
evidence simply appears in a greater number of cases overall, resulting in
a greater likelihood that disputes arise. It may be that the enactment of
"innocence protection" statutes, which grant the defendant an
affirmative entitlement to test evidence before or after trial,7 engenders
frustration when defendants fail to conduct such tests but nonetheless
challenge the evidence at trial. After all, if a painless and reliable lie
detector or DNA test were available, why would any falsely accused
person not take advantage of the opportunity to demonstrate innocence?
Or, it may simply be that prosecutors particularly bristle against
adversarial attacks on proof that seems scientifically unimpeachable.'
Whatever the reason, the apparent rise in such conflicts seems to be
transforming what has historically been only an occasional problem of
evidentiary boundary setting into a pervasive question regarding the
scope and standards of evidentiary argument with regard to this form of
evidence.
This Article explores the question of the proper latitude to accord
both the defense and prosecution when it comes to the range of available
challenges and inferences made with regard to scientifically or
technologically sophisticated evidence. Specifically, I address this
question with an eye toward understanding how the particular
characteristics of second generation scientific evidence should inform
these determinations. Part I reviews cases in which the kinds of disputes
relevant for this discussion were raised-without regard to the type of
4. Id. at 722-23 n.4.
5. Id. at 726-31. I have previously described such "second generation" evidence as defined by its
breadth of application across offenses; scientific robustness; mechanical sophistication; reliance on
databasing and investigative capacity; and propensity to raise issues related to privacy and proprietary
information. Id. Examples include DNA typing, fMRI imaging, electronic location tracking, and data
mining. Id.
6. Indeed, the emergence of these kinds of concerns with regard to DNA testing prompted the
American Bar Association to convene a committee to examine the issue, and then promulgate an
advisory standard. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTiCE: DNA EVIDENCE § 5.4 (3d ed. 2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dnaevidence.pdf.
7. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4132(C) (2002).
8. There is even a moniker for the effect that second generation scientific evidence purportedly
has on jurors, namely the "CSI Effect" -after a television show in which forensic evidence solves the
most intractable of problems. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects:
Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEw ENG. L. REV. 435,435-36 (2oo7) (describing taxonomy
of "effects").
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forensic technique in question -and sets forth three general categories of
claims raised. Part II identifies the particular legal doctrines that have
been used to resolve such conflicts. Finally, Part III considers how the
principles and policies that animate those doctrines might particularly
resonate with reference to the unique characteristics of second
generation evidence.
I. CASE EXAMPLES
Litigation over the permissible scope of argument regarding forensic
evidence is not new. A review of the cases suggests a range of claims and
issues, which I have distilled into three basic categories. Specifically, the
cases embody dispute over: (I) appropriation of defense experts; (2)
missing witness arguments; and (3) concession of guilt inferences.'
A. GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATION OF DEFENSE EXPERT
The first category of cases involves those in which the government
seeks to call a nontestifying defense expert as its own witness-either on
its own initiative or after the defense attacks the government's evidence.
For instance, in People v. Speck, the government in a high-profile murder
case called a fingerprinting expert retained (but not called at trial) by the
defense to confirm the government's experts' conclusions.' ° On appeal,
the court rejected a claim of violation of the attorney-client privilege,
noting that a "witness is not the property of either party to a suit and
simply because one party may have conferred with a witness and even
paid him for his expert advice does not render him incompetent to testify
for the other party."" The court further noted that the testimony was
limited to "expert opinion" rather than any contents of conversations
with the defense.'2
Other courts have reached different conclusions. For instance, in
Oines v. State, a drunk driving arrestee exceeded the legal limit on a
police-administered breathalyzer test, and then requested transfer to a
hospital where a blood sample was taken at his request.'3 The sample was
drawn and kept in state custody.'4 In preparation for trial, the defense
9. I use the term "concession of guilt" here to distinguish purposefully between evidence of
"consciousness of guilt," which typically relates to facts about the defendant's behavior rather than
actions of legal strategy. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BROUN, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 263 (6th ed. 2o06)
("admissions by conduct"). I also do not use "admission of guilt" so as not to reference the evidentiary
exception. Id.
10. 242 N.E.2d 2o8, 219 (Ill. 1968), vacated in part on other grounds, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
ii. Id. at 220-21. In a case involving defense retention of a psychiatric expert, the Alaska
Supreme Court found a violation both of attorney-client privilege and the constitutional right to
counsel in the government's subpoenaing and calling the uncalled defense expert as a witness.
Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 789-96 (Alaska 1979).
12. Speck, 242 N.E.2d at 221.
13. 803 P.2d 884,885-86 (Alaska Ct. App. 199o).
14. Id. at 885.
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attorney had the blood independently tested by an expert, but when the
results confirmed the breathalyzer, the attorney chose not to call the
expert.'5 The government, however, subpoenaed the expert and elicited
the confirmatory testimony. 6 Distinguishing the case from one in which
the court had allowed the evidence because the defendant's request for
"an independent test" was made on his own, rather than on the advice of
counsel, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that the government's use of
the expert violated the attorney-client privilege.'7
Similarly, in State v. Dunn, the trial court permitted the government
to call two experts retained by the defense to conduct independent
testing of the alleged narcotic in question because the experts had
reached the same results as the witnesses for the government.'8 Surveying
the legal authorities cited by other courts, the appellate court rejected
claims based on the Fifth Amendment self incrimination right, but held
the action impermissible under either a work product privilege or the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.'9
As these cases suggest, courts have differed in their treatment of the
issue of government appropriation of defense witnesses. Moreover, these
treatments have addressed a range of potentially applicable legal
doctrines.
B. GOVERNMENT ARGUING THAT DEFENSE ACTIONS SUPPORT MISSING
WITNESS INFERENCE
The second category of cases are those in which the government
seeks to elicit evidence that the defense sought and received an expert
opinion, but did not present that expert at trial. The inference, either
expressly drawn or by implication, is that the defendant's own expert's
opinion hurt the defense position, which both bolsters the government's
evidence and undermines any defense attacks on that evidence.
At the most basic level, cases in this category involve government
elicitation of testimony that evidence was deliberately preserved and
available for defense testing. A handful of courts have upheld the
admissibility of such testimony."0 Similar in nature are cases such as
15. Id. at 885-86.
16. Id. at 886.
17. Id. at 886 (citing Russell v. Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687 692 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)).
i8. 571 S.E.2d 650, 656-6o (N.C. 2002).
19. Id. at 658-59 ("[A]llowing the disclosure to the prosecution of a report prepared by a defense
investigator would not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege which, 'being personal to
the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at
trial."' (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975))).
20. See, e.g., People v. Gray, 118 P.3d 496, 522 (Cal. 2005) (finding no reversible error where
prosecutor elicited testimony that evidence was preserved for defense testing, and that in fact defense
experts had retrieved evidence from government lab, and then argued in closing that failure to call
experts suggested that their results were consistent with government testimony); People v. Success,
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Commonwealth v. Evans," and People v. Bolden,2 in which the
government elicited testimony from its own experts that defense
experts-not called by any party at trial-had been actually present at
the time of the government's testing. 3 Both courts held that the
admission of the testimony was not in error. 4
For example, in Bolden, the government notified the defense that
testing would destroy the entire sample, and so the defense contracted
with an expert to be present to observe the testing.25 At trial, the defense
called a different expert to attack the manner in which the government
expert conducted the tests. In response, the government called the
defense expert that had been present at the testing, who testified in a
hearing outside the presence of the jury. 7 Although that expert
ultimately did not testify at trial, the government did cross-examine the
testifying defense expert witness and elicit that the first, nontestifying
expert had observed the test. In closing, the prosecutor then urged the
jury to consider the defendant's reasons for not calling the original
expert in its assessment of the attacks made by the defense on the
reliability of the tests2S On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's
claims, finding that "[i]n deciding the significance of the failure of either
party to call [the expert] as a witness, the jury could properly consider
the information that the defense had hired [the expert] to do the
testing." 9
Other courts have followed analogous logic in reaching similar
conclusions. In Evans, the court rejected an identical claim, noting that
"[tihe prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that the defendants had a
duty to call those experts, or that by failing to call them they were
somehow admitting guilt."3  Accordingly, the "evidence did not
constitute a comment on the defendants' right to remain silent."3
Similarly, the court in Pope v. State found no violation of the work
product privilege when the government elicited testimony about the
No. 243081, 2004 WL I121871, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004) (per curiam) (finding no improper
burden shifting in prosecutor's question to defense expert that samples could have been retested to
safeguard integrity and bolster defendant's theory).
21. 778 N.E.2d 885, 896 (Mass. 2002).
22. 58 P.3d 931, 951-53 (Cal. 2002).
23. Bolden, 58 P.3d at 952; Evans, 778 N.E.2d at 896.
24. Evans, 778 N.E.2d at 896, addressed Fifth Amendment right of silence claims, whereas
Bolden, 58 P.3d at 953, addressed claims of violation of due process, the attorney-client privilege, and
effective assistance of counsel.
25. Bolden, 58 P.3d at 952.
26. Id. at 953.
27. Id. at 952.
28. Id. at 953.
29. Id. at 954-55.
30. Commonwealth v. Evans, 778 N.E.2d 885, 896 (Mass. 2002).
31. Id.
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identity, "eminent" qualifications, and failure to dispute the conclusions
of the state by a retained defense expert.32 Although the jury was not
expressly told that the expert had been contracted by the defense, the
prosecutor did elicit from two state DNA experts that they had delivered
the materials to another expert, and that the other expert had not
requested retesting of the evidence or disagreed in any respect.3 In
closing, the state reiterated that testimony and argued that "if [the
defense] had one person, one expert who knew anything about DNA and
the testing procedures, they would have put somebody on that witness
stand today."'
Some courts have, however, rejected such arguments. In People v.
Coddington, the defense hired seven psychiatric experts to evaluate the
defendant, but called only three as witnesses.35 The government learned
of the nontestifying witnesses through jail sign-in sheets, and argued to
the jury that the failure to call them as witnesses suggested that the
experts had reached conclusions adverse to the defense.3 The court held
that, while it was permissible to elicit evidence of nontestifying expert
examinations, it violated work product privilege for the prosecutor to
argue any adverse inferences from their absence.37 Similarly, in State v.
Cloutier, the court reviewed the prosecutor's elicitation of testimony that
the defendant's representative had received blood samples from the
state.38 Worrying that "such questioning could create a missing-test-result
inference," the court nonetheless found no error because the government
had not argued any adverse inferences in closing.39
As these cases show, courts have proven relatively amenable to
evidence put forward by the government, and arguments regarding the
inferences to be drawn therefrom, with respect to nontestifying defense
experts.
C. GOVERNMENT ARGUING THAT DEFENSE ACTIONS SUPPORT CONCESSION
OF GUILT INFERENCE
The last category of cases contains those in which the government
seeks to elicit evidence that the defendant had the opportunity or even
right to conduct independent analysis or obtain an expert opinion about
the contested evidence, but did not do so. The government thus
effectively suggests that this failure to enlist expert assistance supports an
32. 207 S.W. 3 d 352, 354,366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
33. See id. at 356.
34. Id. at 356-57.
35. 2 P.3 d io8i, 1140-41 (Cal. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25
P.3 d 618, 633 n.13 (Cal. 2ooi).
36. Id. at 1141.
37. Id. at 1142.
38. 628 A.2d 1047, 1048-49 (Me. 1993).
39. Id. at 1049.
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inference that the defendant knew that such assistance would not be
helpful, either because the defendant is in fact guilty or simply because
the attacks by the defense on the evidence are not supportable.
For instance, in State v. Glynn, the defense attacked the
government's failure to conduct any forensic tests at all.'0 In response,
the government argued that
the law says that the defendant has the right to test any item in
evidence. You want a rape kit, you want sheets, here they are. Been
sitting in the Sheriff's Office. Did the defendant have a DNA test
performed? Did the defendant attempt to run the test that [defense
counsel] says will exculpate her client? No. Two edged sword, isn't it,
ladies and gentlemen?4
The court rejected the defendant's claim on appeal, noting that "[o]n
rebuttal, the prosecution had the right to answer the argument of the
defendant."42
Similarly, in Miller v. State, the government elicited testimony and
made arguments concerning the failure of the defense to avail itself of
the opportunity to test after the defense criticized the government's
failure to test.43 The court held that such argument did not constitute
impermissible burden shifting, but rather constituted a "proper response
to the argument raised in defense counsel's closing."" In State v. Ledet,
the defense challenged the DNA results as compromised and
erroneous.45 In response, the government argued that the defense could
have hired its own expert and done independent testing. Finding no error
in the government's argument, the court concluded that the government
"was merely asking the jury to compare the State's evidence with the
defendant's lack of evidence. ' '46 The court in State v. Roman Nose, while
expressing "concern[] about the prosecutor's question regarding the
defense ability to retest the sample," ultimately found no abuse of
discretion in the testimony because it arguably responded to the defense
attack on the state's testing. 7
40. 653 So. 2d I288, 13o8 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 830 P.2d 419, 425 (Wyo. 1992); accord People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1253-54 (Ill.
1984) (finding no burden shifting in government's arguments about defendant's right and yet failure to
test); Van Duser v. State, 796 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo. 199o) (finding no impermissible burden shifting in
government's argument that defense failed to conduct supportive testing).
44. Miller, 830 P.2d at 426.
45. 792 So. 2d i6o, 176 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
46. Id.; accord People v. Reid, 592 N.W.2d 767, 776-78 (Mich. App. 1999) (finding it not improper
burden shifting for prosecutor in closing to comment on defendant's failure to provide blood samples
from wife to bolster defense theory); cf State v. Grice, 537 A.2d 683, 688-89 (N.J. 1988) (finding no
error in trial court's statements suggesting that defendant and government equally shared burden of
bringing forth scientific evidence).
47. 667 N.W.2d 386,400 (Minn. 2003).
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In contrast, however, the court in Hayes v. State, held it
impermissible burden shifting for the prosecutor to comment on the
defendant's failure to test blood stains, as well as to elicit testimony from
the government's expert that he had received such requests from defense
attorneys in the past. 48 Finding such comments "prejudicial," the court
observed that "'the state cannot comment on a defendant's failure to
produce evidence to refute an element of the crime, because doing so
could erroneously lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the
burden of introducing evidence.'
II. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORKS
Although I have grouped the manner in which these cases arise into
three general categories, the courts have neither hewn to this typology
nor have they resolved the questions raised in each case using a uniform
doctrinal approach. Rather, there exists a scattershot of legal doctrines
under which these kinds of questions appear to be resolved, without
strict regard to whether the claim is presented as an appropriation,
missing witness, or concession of guilt issue. Indeed, defendants raise a
variety of claims across each category, and courts have ruled with equal
breadth." This Part briefly examines the relevant doctrines in turn.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL
I. Burden Shifting (Fifth Amendment)
It is axiomatic in our criminal justice system that the defendant is
presumed innocent, and that the government bears the burden of
proving its case. Neither of these entitlements appears specifically in the
Constitution itself, but they are enshrined in the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as essential to the fabric of our adversarial
system." Numerous cases have raised claims of improper burden shifting
in response to government missing witness and concession of guilt type
48. 66o So. 2d 257, 265-66 (Fla. 1995). But cf People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004) (rejecting claim of improper burden shifting where government expert, in response to defense
question about possibility of false positive DNA test, replied that lab policy required retention of
sample available for retesting in event of challenge).
49. Hayes, 66o So. 2d at 265 (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 18I, 188 (Fla. i9i)).
50. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 789-96 (Alaska 1979); Oines v. State, 803 P.2d 884,
886-87 (Alaska Ct. App. 199o); People v. Bolden, 58 P.3d 931, 950-54 (Cal. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Evans, 778 N.E.2d 885, 896 (Mass. 2002); State v. Mingo, 392 A.2d 59 o , 594 (N.J. 1978). The primary
exceptions are that concession of guilt claims do not raise Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims or
work product claims and that appropriation claims tend not to raise Fifth Amendment self
incrimination claims. But see People v. Spiezer, 735 N.E.2d 1017, 1020-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination serves as a basis upon which courts have
found that defense experts and expert materials need not be disclosed to the government).
51. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("Due process commands that no




For example, a number of cases have grappled with concession of
guilt arguments under the rubric of burden shifting, and concluded that
such inquiries are generally permissible regardless of whether the
government is attacking the defense's failure to undertake corroborative
or exculpatory testing, or whether the defense is attacking the
government's failure to test. In People v. Success, the government asked
the defense expert whether he had recommended that the questioned
DNA samples be independently retested. 3 The court concluded that the
burden was not improperly shifted, as the evidence "challenged the
credibility of the testimony elicited from the expert by defense counsel
on direct examination" and "directly challenged the defense's alternative
theory.' ' In a similar case, a different court found no improper burden
shifting because the questioning likewise "directly challenged the
credibility of testimonial evidence elicited by the defense in support of its
theory of the case."55 The court observed that "once the defendant
advances evidence or a theory, argument on the inferences created does
not shift the burden of proof.",6 And in State v. Glynn, the court found no
error in the prosecutor's argument in rebuttal that the defendant had not
exercised his right to forensic testing, "noting that the defense had
pretrial access to the physical evidence and could have produced its own
DNA tests was clearly an attempt to respond to defense counsel's closing
argument regarding the lack of DNA evidence.""
Other cases likewise reject burden shifting claims founded on
arguments related to the defense's failure to secure an expert to bolster
its theory. For instance, in Benson v. State, the defense attorney failed to
apply for funding for an expert in light of the denial of his motion for
funds for trial transcripts.: When the prosecutor argued that the
52. Naturally, appropriation cases do not raise burden-shifting arguments, although a case could
be made that appropriation of defense experts creates a presumption that the forensic evidence is
correct, and thereby shifts the burden of disproving it to the defense.
53. No. 24308I, 2004 WL ii21871, at *i (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004) (per curiam).
54. Id. at *2.
55. People v. Reid, 592 N.W.2d 767, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
56. Id.; accord State v. Lehr, 38 P.3d 1172, 1185 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (holding no burden
shifting for government to ask its expert about a print card on file should an independent test be
sought); People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98, 105 (Colo. Ct. App. 20o4) (finding no error in arguing that
best check against false positive is retesting and it was available to do so); State v. Harris, 892 So. 2d
1238, 1255 (La. 2005) (declaring it not improper to argue in rebuttal that the defendant never
requested DNA testing); White v. State, 934 S.W.2d 891, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding
there is no burden shifting in government statement that defense could have retested after defense
attacked evidence for contamination); Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Wyo. 1992) (finding
admissible over burden-shifting objection the prosecutor's elicitation of rape defendant's failure to test
DNA evidence found at scene).
57. 653 So. 2d 1288, 1308-9 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
58. 636 A.2d 9o7, 91O-il (Del. 1994).
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defense's failure to call an expert evinced concession of guilt, the
defendant claimed improper burden shifting.59 The court denied the
claim, holding that "when an indigent defendant fails to make an
application for state funds, regardless of the perceived likelihood of
approval of the application, the defendant is barred from asserting that
an expert witness is unavailable for purposes of preventing prosecutorial
comment on the defense's failure to call an expert witness." 6° Some
courts have even gone a step further, and found no reversible burden
shifting in such arguments even where the request for a defense expert
was denied.6'
In contrast to these cases, some courts have found such argument to
constitute an improper shifting of the burden. For instance, in Hayes v.
State, the court found improper the elicitation of testimony and
subsequent argument about the defense's failure to test the forensic• 62
evidence. Examining the comments, the court concluded that the state
may have wrongly "led the jury to believe that Hayes had an obligation
to test the evidence found at the scene .. and to prove that the hair and
blood samples did not match his own. '6 The court further rejected the
argument that the defense attacks on the evidence somehow "invited"
comments, and noted that the curative instruction informing the jury that
the defense bore no "obligation to test the evidence," although it did
have an "opportunity," was inadequate, because .'[o]pportunity' in this
context implies an obligation." 64 The court in Essary v. State also found
improper burden shifting in the government's commenting to the jury
about the failure to hear from a defense expert.65 The court observed that
"the only reasonable inference from that argument would be that the
State was telling the jury that if the criminalist's conclusions were invalid,
the defense would have produced evidence to the contrary," suggesting
that the defense had "a burden the defense does not bear."
59. Id. at 9o.
60. Id. at gii; accord Stallsworth v. State, 868 So. 2d 1128, 1I55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) ("The
remarks were not directed at any particular witness's failure to testify but were directed at the
defense's failure to call a DNA expert to rebut the State's DNA evidence."); People v. McKinley, 6og
N.E.2d 720, 725-26 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding no violation where state in rebuttal closing said
defense could have called own experts, because provoked or invited by defendant).
6i. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Texas, 15 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2ooo) (holding as
harmless error prosecutor's argument to jury that the government did not want to waste taxpayer
money conducting DNA test in response to defense argument regarding government's failure to test,
even though defendant was denied request for own defense expert).
62. 660 So. 2d 257, 265 (Fla. 1995).
63. Id. at 265-66.
64. Id. at 265.
65. Essary v. State, No. o7-96-o285-CR, 1997 WL 3 27 116, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. June i 1, 1997).
66. Id. State v. Ashby, 567 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1997), turned on narrower evidentiary grounds.
There, the government cited the defendant's failure to undertake gunpowder residue or DNA testing
as a means of proving his innocence as support for the conclusion that he was in fact guilty. Id. at 28.
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2. Right to Silence (Fifth Amendment)
The Fifth Amendment also gives rise to another source of authoritZ
for these kinds of challenges-namely, the Self Incrimination Clause.
Indeed, the dual protections of due process burden shifting and the right
to silence interweave in this particular context. The proscription on
burden shifting relieves the defense of the responsibility of having to put
forward any evidence or to disprove guilt (or prove innocence), whereas
the self incrimination clause more narrowly ensures that the
government's efforts to adduce such proof exclude the compelling of
evidence from the defendant's own mouth.
In light of the intersection of these two doctrines, it is no surprise
that cases have in fact treated them together. For example, in State v.
Lehr, the court addressed a burden-shifting claim raised in response to
the government's elicitation from its expert of evidence that independent
fingerprint examiners could have been retained by the defense. 68 The
court denied the claim, noting that "discussing a defendant's failure to
produce evidence is permissible so long as it does not constitute a
comment on his or her silence." ' Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Evans,
the defendant argued that the government's elicitation of evidence that
defense experts were present at the time of government testing, and
therefore "could have detected any errors in the testing procedures,"
constituted improper burden shifting.7' The court, dismissing the claim,
remarked that the government had not suggested "that the defendants
had a duty to call those experts, or that by failing to call them they were
somehow admitting guilt."7' Thus, the comment did not infringe either
due process or the right to remain silent.72
In contrast, in Essary v. State the court rejected an argument based
on the right to silence, observing that "[i]n order to fall within that
prohibited area, the language must be manifestly intended, or of such a
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the defendant's failure to testify and must be more than an
implied or indirect allusion."73 Because the evidence would come from
Ignoring the defendant's claim of improper burden shifting, the court ruled the comment
impermissible as not based on the evidence-since no evidence had been adduced to show that the
defendant was aware of the possibility of such tests-but found it to be harmless error. Id.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. 38 P.3d I 172, 1185 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
69. Id.
70. 778 N.E.2d 885, 896 (Mass. 2002).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Essary v. State, No. o7- 9 6-o285-CR, 1997 WL 327116, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. June II, 1997);
accord People v. Spiezer, 735 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (reviewing cases and concluding
that "the fifth amendment privilege [is] personal to the defendant and [does] not extend to the
statements taken of witnesses"); State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650, 656, 658 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
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"another source, i.e., an expert," it could not be considered as infringing
the defendant's privilege.74
Other courts have addressed Fifth Amendment claims more
squarely. In State v. Ledet, the defense attacked the government's DNA
tests as contaminated and unreliable.75 In response, the prosecutor
argued that the defendant
could have hired his own lab, his own lab. If he thought that these tests
were so outrageous and so wrong; do you know that? His own lab.
Like ReliaGene is just in Harahan, isn't it? If he thought that those
results would come back in favor of his client; did you know that?
Think about that, because these tests, there was nothing wrong with
these tests.
76
Upholding the comments as permissible, the court found they did
not constitute a comment on the failure to testify but rather "merely
ask[ed] the jury to compare the State's evidence with the defendant's
lack of evidence. 77 The same conclusion was reached by the court in
State v. Peters, which found no Fifth Amendment violation in the state
expert's assertion, "You know, if I were a defendant, and I were falsely
accused as being the source of biological evidence, I would want to
continue testing" until innocence was proven.7s The court in
Commonwealth v. Conkey, however, reached the opposite conclusion,
finding a violation of the state constitutional right to silence in the
prosecutor's argument that defendant's refusal to submit palm prints for
testing constituted concession of guilt.
79
3. Right to Assistance of Counsel (Sixth Amendment)
A third source of constitutional authority in these kinds of cases can
be found in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 8 Here, again, claims
tend to be overlapping. For instance, in United States v. Alvarez, the
defense attorney obtained funds for a psychiatric expert to examine the
client's sanity.s ' After the expert found the defendant legally sane, the
government called him at trial to help defeat the defense of insanity."s On
appeal, the defendant challenged the testimony, claiming a violation of
his Fifth Amendment right to silence, the Sixth Amendment right to
(rejecting self incrimination claim based on government's use of defense-retained expert's reports on
same basis).
74. Essary, 1997 WL 3271 16, at *6.
75. 792 So. 2d 16o, 176 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 944 P.2d 896,903 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
79. 714 N.E.2d 343,347-48 (Mass. 1999).
8o. The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall.., have the assistance of counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
81. 519 F.2d 1036, 1045 (3d Cir. 1975).
82. Id.
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effective assistance of counsel, and the attorney-client privilege.
Dismissing the Fifth Amendment claims because the disclosures were
not compelled, the court upheld the Sixth Amendment challenge,
recognizing that an "attorney must be free to make an informed
judgment with respect to the best course for the defense without the
inhibition of creating a potential government witness."
8 3
The court in State v. Mingo confronted a similar situation and found
error in the court's allowing the government to subpoena and elicit
evidence from the defendant's uncalled handwriting expert."4 The court
first cited the need for defense counsel to exercise "full investigative
latitude in developing a meritorious defense on his client's behalf," and
worried that "[i]f the confidentiality of [expert] advice cannot be
anticipated, the attorney might well forego seeking such assistance, to the
consequent detriment of his client's cause. ' '5 Likening the interest to that
vindicated by the attorney-client privilege, the court found an imperative
in "safeguard[ing] the internal strategic processes of the defense" by
assuring that the attorney is "completely free and unfettered in making a
decision as fundamental as that concerning the retention of an expert to
assist him. 's6 The court in a similar case, State v. Dunn, reached an
identical conclusion, adding that defense attorneys might not only be
deterred, but they might also "be motivated to hire only those experts
which they have reason to believe will lean their way," which would
hamper-not aid-the search for truth .
To the contrary, the court in Noggle v. Marshall found that the Sixth
Amendment did not preclude the government from calling the
nontestifying defense expert as its own witness.68 The court found it
undesirable "to canonize the majority rule on the attorney-psychiatrist-
client privilege and freeze it into constitutional form not amenable to
change.'8' And in People v. Bolden, the court found no violation of the
83. Id. at 1045, 1047.
84. 392 A.2d 590, 592-94 (N.J. I978); accord Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 789 (Alaska I979)
("The effective assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense demands
recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney
he is assisting."); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 876 (Colo. 1976) (finding Sixth Amendment
violation in trial court's "decision to permit the prosecution to call the defense-retained expert in its
case-in-chief"); cf. Prince v. Superior Court, so Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
Sixth Amendment violation in trial court order to split evidentiary sample, and testing results, between
government and defense, noting that "while it is true the goal of the judicial process is to find the
truth, allowing the defense to conduct an independent test of the DNA will not unfairly prejudice the
People or result in injustice").
85. Mingo, 392 A.2d at 592,595.
86. Id. at 595.
87. 571 S.E.2d 650,656-60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
88. 706 F.2d 14o8, 1413-14 (6th Cir. 1983) (dismissing Alvarez as having "constitutional
overtones" but not truly "concerned with defining the scope of constitutional guarantees").
89. Id. at 1414.
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Sixth Amendment in a missing witness situation.' ° In that case, evidence
was admitted that a defense expert had witnessed the contested testing.9'
The court also found no violation in the government's argument that the
defendant's failure to call that witness should be taken into
consideration.92
B. STATUTORY OR EVIDENTIARY
Lastly, perhaps the most common doctrine for resolving these kinds
of cases-whether of the appropriation, missing witness, or concession of
guilt variety, is the work product doctrine derived from the attorney-
client privilege.93 In fact, many of the cases ultimately decided on work
product or privilege grounds initially presented Fifth or Sixth
Amendment claims.
For example, in United States v. Walker, the government sought to
call the experts retained by the defense to review the government's
ballistics evidence-whom the defense declined to call in their own
case-in order to bolster the conclusions testified to by the government
expert. 94 The court rejected the government's effort on numerous
grounds, including the "practical application of the 'work-product'
doctrine."'
Noting the similarities between the values protected by this common
law doctrine9 and the constitutional right to counsel, the court declared
that "'[a]t its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental
processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can
analyze and prepare his client's case."'" Calling the doctrine, "an
intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our
adversary system," the Court further observed that "[a]bsent such an
area of qualified privilege.., a criminal defendants' preparation can only
be crippled by the prospect of creating an unfavorable witness every time
he attempts to obtain an unbiased assessment of the government's
evidence." Thus, the privilege operated to bar the government's
90. 58 P.3d 931, 952-53 (Cal. 2002).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 954. The court considered the latter point relevant for "bias." Id.
93. A fraction of cases resolve these kinds of issues on other evidentiary grounds, for instance the
"logical witness" rule, see, e.g., People v. Wash, 861 P.2d ito7, 1t37 (Cal. 1993), or as a form of
"admission-by-conduct," Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 466-71 (2ooi) (providing overview of issue and advocating generally for
limited commenting).
94. 910 F. Supp. 861, 863,865-66 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
95. Id. at 864.
96. The cardinal expression of the doctrine, which is embodied to some extent by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), is found in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 5o09-1O (I947).
97. Walker, 9io F. Supp. at 865 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)).
98. Id.
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appropriation of the defendant's uncalled expert." The court in
Commonwealth v. Kennedy reached the same conclusion on similar facts,
reasoning that allowing the government to call defense experts would
"unjustifiably hamper[]" the defense by placing attorneys in the
"unenviable position of independently investigating evidence that may
exonerate their clients, while, at the same time, risking the creation of
evidence against their clients."'"°
The missing witness cases are more divided. In Pope v. State, for
example, the court rejected a work product privilege claim that arose
from the government's questioning of its experts as to their sharing their
conclusions with a renowned expert retained by the defense."" The court
declared that the state's consulting-expert privilege was "intended to be
only 'a shield to prevent a litigant from taking undue advantage of his
adversary's industry and effort, not a sword to be used to thwart
justice ...... Finding that the identity and eminence of the defense expert
was information in the public domain and therefore not protected, along
with the fact that the defendant did not call the expert as a witness at
trial, the court found the privilege inapplicable. 3
In contrast, in People v. Coddington, the court found a violation of
the privilege in the government's questioning of witnesses as to the
existence of other nontestifying defense experts that had evaluated the
defendant.' °4 Resting its conclusion on the work product doctrine, the
court observed that the privilege
reflects 'the policy of the state to (I) preserve the rights of attorneys to
prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to
99. Id.; see also United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (addressing claims
both in terms of effective assistance of counsel and attorney-client privilege); People v. Spiezer, 735
N.E.2d IOI7, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (reviewing various doctrines and stating that "we are persuaded
by the holdings from all the foregoing case law" across a variety of doctrines, but ultimately
concluding that "the work product doctrine is the proper basis of such protection"); State v. Mingo,
392 A.2d 590, 594 (N.J. 1978) ("We think it makes no difference whether the principle calling for
vindication in such a situation is to be denominated the effective representation by counsel or the
attorney-client privilege."); State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 423-25 (N.J. 1957).
oo. 876 A.2d 939, 948 (Pa. 2005), overruling in part Commonwealth v. Porter, 569 A.2d 942, 944-
45 (Pa. 199o) (upholding government's calling of defense expert, and elicitation of expert's conclusions
and fact of prior retention by the defense, on unspecific grounds); see also Oines v. State, 803 P.2d 884,
886 (Alaska 199o) (finding breach of attorney-client privilege in government use of blood test results
commissioned by defense).
iOt. 207 S.W. 3 d 352, 363-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also People v. Speck, 242 N.E.2d 208, 221
(Il1. 1968) ("A witness is not the property of either party to a suit and simply because one party may
have conferred with a witness and even paid for his expert advice does not render him incompetent to
testify for the other party.").
102. Pope, 207 S.W.3 d at 359 (quoting Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.
I990)).
103. Id. at 363-64.
104. 2 P.3d io8i, 1141-42 (Cal. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25
P.3d 618, 633 & n.13 (Cal. 2001).
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encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate
not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of the case, and (2)
to prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's
industry and efforts."' 5
The prosecutor's missing witness inferences, therefore, "contravened
that policy.""' 6
III. THE SECOND GENERATION CONSIDERED
As the foregoing Part elaborates, a variety of overlapping doctrines
have been invoked to address the concerns raised when the government
appropriates a defense witness or argues that the failure of the defense to
consult or call an expert leads to a proper inference of the defendant's
guilt. As the very existence of such doctrinal overlap suggests, the legal
rules that have been cited to resolve such concerns share many
underlying values."° This Part reviews those values, and asks how the
distinctive characteristics of second generation evidence might affect
their consideration. In short, this Part observes the particular temptation
to succumb to such arguments with regard to technologically
sophisticated and robust forms of proof, but argues that their unique
characteristics in fact counsel greater circumspection in fixing the range
of permissible argumentation and inference.
I have previously observed that "second generation" techniques
exhibit traits that distinguish them from their simpler, "first generation"
counterparts.' °  This "second generation" includes forensic methods such
as DNA typing, fMRI imaging, or biometric scanning."9 Unlike their first
generation counterparts, these techniques tend to apply broadly across a
range of offenses, be scientifically and technically robust, entail
mechanically sophisticated equipment, be proactive in their investigative
capacity, and raise concerns of privacy and proprietary information."'
These characteristics of second generation techniques make witness
appropriation, missing evidence, and concession of guilt arguments
especially tempting. The knowledge that deeply contested questions-
whether regarding the perpetrator's identity or the ultimate question of
guilt-might be able to be resolved conclusively by a scientific test
cannot help but strain the patience of those whose mission it is to seek
truth. After all, it must feel all but intolerable to have to stand idly by as
105. Id. at 1142 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018(a) (West 1998) (repealed 2004)).
lo6. Id.
io7. For purposes of convenience, this Part refers to the legal entitlements as "Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights," although technically the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine-
while an off-shoot of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-derive from nonconstitutional
authorities.




a defendant launches an attack on seemingly reliable scientific evidence
while refusing to avail himself of the opportunity to test that evidence
independently and thereby prove his innocence.
In addition to being tempting, such arguments may also become
more and more common. The first characteristic of the second
generation-the breadth of application-suggests that such evidentiary
disputes might be expected to come up more frequently. Of course,
forensic evidence has historically played a significant part in criminal
cases, but that role is likely only to increase as the second generation of
scientific evidence matures. I" Already, new second generation
techniques like DNA typing, data mining, and electronic location
tracking have been relied upon to prove a defendant's guilt."12 And it
might not be long before even more advanced techniques-such as
highly reliable lie detector machines or long distance iris scanning
devices" 3-become equally common forms of proof.
Indeed, simple anecdotal observation of the research conducted for
this article suggests that a large percentage of cases raising claims of
improper appropriation or argument emerged in cases involving newer
technologies like DNA testing."4 Of course, the disproportionate
influence may be simply that DNA evidence is presented in a larger
percentage of cases generally, because it functions across the breadth of
case types and is so highly probative."5 But whatever the reason for an
apparent increase in the number of cases raising claims related to the
evidentiary import of forensic testing decisions, it appears that such
disputes may well be on the rise. In fact, just recently the American Bar
Association convened a committee to consider, and ultimately
promulgate, a standard treating this topic."6
In sum, as second generation forensic evidence occupies a more
central role in the adjudication of criminal cases, the evidentiary
implications of the defense decision making regarding such evidence will
likewise become more important. To date, none of the cases discussing
the appropriation, missing witness, or concession of guilt arguments
made by the government-or contemplating the constitutional values at
stake when such actions occur-have considered the question in light of
I II. Id. at 731-44 (discussing case example of DNA typing).
112. Id. at 723-24, 728-29.
113. See Greely & Illes, supra note 2; Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming Mar. 2008) (discussing iris scanning technologies); Margaret Talbot, Duped, NEW
YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 52-61 (discussing fMRI imaging, including a new company called "No Lie
MRI" that through a very limited set of experimental studies purports to achieve 9o% accuracy).
114. Psychiatric exams also constitute a sizeable percentage of the cases uncovered in this research
effort.
115. Murphy, supra note 3, at 731-38. Of course, the very probativeness of such evidence might
also make such cases less likely to be reported, as many would be expected instead to plead out.
116. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6.
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the particular characteristics of this second generation. This Part
endeavors to remedy that.
A. PRESERVATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE FUNCTION IN AN
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The notion that lawyers require full freedom to investigate a case
without fear of adverse consequences underpins almost all of the
doctrines discussed in the preceding Part. For instance, the right to
effective assistance of counsel and the attorney-client privilege both
explicitly rest upon the principle that the full realization of the defense
function, and therefore the adversarial system itself, requires the
recognition and protection of a zone of confidentiality to pursue lines of
investigation and discuss strategy away from the intruding eyes of the
government.
Even the Fifth Amendment injunctions against burden shifting and
self incrimination serve to fulfill this need to preserve the integrity and
freedom of the defense function. Without such rules, the government
could simply demand that the accused tender all the evidence in its
possession-whether inculpatory or exculpatory. And if that were the
case, then even an innocent accused would hesitate to pursue avenues of
investigation with uncertain ends. The right to remain silent and put the
government to its proof does not just protect the guilty from uttering
confessions; it also, arguably most importantly, protects the innocent
from unwittingly building the government's case against them."7 For
instance, it may be that the defense turns up a witness who places the
defendant at the scene when someone else fired the fatal shots, but if the
government cannot adduce its own evidence, then our system leaves it up
to the defense to determine whether to disclose its information.
Otherwise, the affirmations of the defense might cloud important
weaknesses in the government's case. More troubling, the knowledge
that efforts to investigate could be used against the defendant will
discourage any such efforts at all.
Encroachment upon defense autonomy by allowing appropriation,
missing evidence, or concession of guilt arguments therefore merit
careful attention. In particular, the peculiar characteristics of second
generation forensic evidence demand express acknowledgement in any
assessment of the impact that such arguments have on the preservation
of the underlying value of an autonomous defense function.
For example, the methodological robustness and mechanical
117. Cf. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 526-27 (1973) (contrasting American rule
with the continental system, which lacks a robust right to silence and in which the taking of evidence
frequently begins with the testimony of the defendant).
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sophistication of second generation evidence makes it both susceptible to
such arguments and poorly suited to them. Forensic evidence differs
from other forms of proof. The statement of a witness, or the presence of
the victim's property in the defendant's house, speak as plainly to the lay
person as they do to the lawyer. A defense lawyer confronted with such
evidence need not consult others to ascertain its fundamental import-
the evidence can be apprehended, and tested, without any particular
expertise. Even a "first generation" method like handwriting analysis or
ballistics is fairly readily ascertainable-a layperson can look at two
images and make an independent determination that two grooves or
loops look identical.
But a second generation form of proof is not so readily
comprehensible. The DNA electropherogram or fMRI image cannot not
be as easily appraised. As a result, the determination to secure expert
assistance is as much an effort to understand the evidence as it is to
challenge it. And understanding evidence is the duty of every lawyer and
therefore not an appropriate basis of any permissible adverse inference.
In addition to the complexity of such evidence, another trait of
forensic evidence renders arguments about the decision to test or not
inappropriate: the government's exclusive access to physical evidence
makes truly independent testing of any forensic evidence difficult."8
Forensic evidence, regardless of its level of sophistication, is typically
under the peculiar control of the government. Physical items are stored
by police departments with (properly) strict rules about access to
materials. In contrast, the defense can privately conduct an investigation
during which it talks, for instance, to fifteen witnesses who bolster the
state's case in the hopes of finding one that does not.
Thus, unlike interviewing a human witness or mapping a processed
crime scene, it is impossible for the defense to examine physical evidence
without first alerting the government of its wishes. Even if the defense
secures access to a physical specimen through an in camera motion, the
government will often learn that the defense has expressed some interest
in the item by the simple fact that it must hand over the evidence to a
court representative."9 A defendant cannot simply conduct a test without
notifying the government of its intentions. Indeed, many jurisdictions
i8. The literature on burden shifting well represents this idea. See, e.g., Barbara Underwood, The
Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1333-36
(1977) (noting relationship between self incrimination and burden rights, and observing that burden of
production-but not persuasion -might be appropriately assigned to defendant where defendant has
peculiar access to information).
It9. See, e.g., Walters v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88o, 88o-8i, 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding unlawful an order issued by a criminal trial court to allow defense inspection of evidence held
by police department and ordering "the department not to advise anyone except the defense of the
testing or the name of the party doing the testing until the preliminary hearing").
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require the defendant to petition the court not only to remove the
evidence for testing, but also for the funds necessary to secure the
expert. 2 ' It is perhaps telling that many of the government appropriation
cases came about because the government, in turning over the physical
evidence to the defense expert, at the same time issued a subpoena. 2'
Rules that allow comment on the defense's investigation, therefore,
simply exploit the government's unique position as both prosecuting
entity and gatekeeper of access to relevant evidence.
Failing to wholly insulate the defendant's decision to subject such
evidence to external appraisal places the defense in the untenable
position of choosing to forego finding the "one" good witness in order to
avoid turning up the bad fifteen. Without protection from government
use of defense findings, the determination of the defense not to obtain
any expert assistance no more constitutes the defendant's endorsement
of the government's conclusions than would the defense's failure to
interview witnesses it knew it would have to disclose if it was to the
government's benefit. In order to protect the defense's incentive and
interest in understanding and contesting the government's evidence,
then, courts must safeguard the defense's ability to generate without
penalty some opinions adverse to its case.
Moreover, with particular regard to second generation methods,
their databasing, proprietary, and privacy-related characteristics make
the government not only the party able to obtain and then seclude such
evidence, but often also grants it total control over the mechanisms of
analysis. For instance, in the case of a DNA match, the government may
not only control the crime scene items that were used for testing, but also
have exclusive domain over the database used to assign a "match" to the
defendant or the primer sequences used to carry out the actual tests. 22 A
DNA defense expert is therefore unlikely to fully replicate tests
performed by the government, or to conduct its own search of a
database. And even where such complete authority is absent, the
mechanical sophistication of second generation techniques may make
access to independent experts more difficult, because fewer such experts
exist.' 23 The lack of a robust external community, therefore, means that
the failure of the defense to offer affirmative contrary evidence
constitutes less of a signal that any attack on the evidence is hollow than
120. Murphy, supra note 3, at 771 & nn.212-13.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 9io F. Supp. 861 (N.D.N.Y. i995); State v. Dunn, 571
S.E.2d 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). Indeed, in People v. Coddington, the state went so far as to exploit its
position as the correctional authority to search "jail sign-in sheets and social contacts" to learn names
of uncalled defense experts. 2 P.3d io81, 1141 (Cal. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v.
Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 633 n.13 (Cal. 2001).
122. Murphy, supra note 3, at 751-56.
123. Id. at 753-56.
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it is a symptom of the dysfunction that afflicts the practice of forensic
evidence.
In short, to permit appropriation, missing evidence, or concession of
guilt arguments by the government prejudicially and unjustifiably ignores
the lopsidedness of the field of forensic evidence. And this does not
change as a result of the defense's trial strategy. By illustrative
comparison, imagine that the government turned over documents written
in Farsi to an English-speaking attorney. The government provides its
translation, which inculpates the defendant. The attorney arranges to
have them translated as well, and the independent translator reports that
one word could have two different meanings-one that inculpates the
defendant, and one that does not. At trial, the government introduces its
translation, and the defense attorney on cross-examination elicits the
possible dual meanings of the contested word. The government expert
acknowledges the contrary meaning, but stands by the original
interpretation.
At this point, the defense attorney may choose not to call the
defense expert, who can do no more than repeat both the defendant's
good (translation may be wrong) and bad (translation may be right)
views of the evidence already admitted. Yet that by no means suggests
that the defense expert's assistance was futile, or that it confirmed the
government's interpretation. It would be wrong to allow the government
to then argue that the defense's decision not to put on its expert
constitutes a concession by the defense that its argument is weak or
bogus, much less that it bolsters the government's view. Moreover, had
the attorney altogether failed to get the document translated, it would be
wrong to allow an inference that that decision amounts to a concession of
guilt on the part of the defendant. If anything, it should raise concerns
about the attorney's performance of the attorney's duties.
In sum, the challenge should stand-or fall-on its own merits,
without bolstering from arguments that the attorney either failed to seek
assistance or sought assistance but did not introduce evidence as a result
of it.'24 Courts surely would hesitate before allowing the government to
124. Of course, this is the standard for the typical missing witness or concession of guilt argument
in other contexts. If the evidence in question is not peculiarly available to the party that failed to make
use of it, then the opposing party-who could have elicited such evidence themselves-may not argue
any adverse inferences. See, e.g., Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3 d 805, 809 (Ky. 2002) (holding it
error to instruct jury that missing evidence could be inferred to be adverse to defendant, since such
instructions are intended only to cure due process problem of missing exculpatory evidence); Eley v.
State, 419 A.2d 384, 387 (Md. i98o) (finding defendant's missing evidence argument appropriate
because the evidence is peculiarly in the government's control, noting that it is "plainly unreasonable
to impose upon a defendant the burden of cross examining the police or of calling the appropriate
personnel to the stand when that action might well result in evidence adverse to his interest"); State v.
Laurent, 744 A.2d 598, 602-03 (N.H. 1999); cf. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART 88I, 903 (2d ed. 1961) (noting that burden of production might fall to defense where information
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elicit evidence that the defendant visited the crime scene, but did not
introduce its own photos, or talked to many witnesses, but did not call
every one of them. Such arguments would simply open the door to a
series of cumbersome, prejudicial, and likely tangential questions as to
why the defense instead relied on the government's photographs or
witnesses in making its attack. To suggest that the mere act of seeking
consultation with regard to complicated forensic evidence-or not
seeking it-should open the door to government appropriation, missing
witness, or concession of guilt comments is to both permit unfounded
speculation into defense strategy while also forcibly relegating the
defense to ignorance, precisely the opposite of the values enshrined by
the Constitution.
B. RESOURCE DISPARITIES
The values underlying the claimed entitlements discussed in Part II
also find expression in the notion that structural inequities between the
resources of the government and the defense require correction in terms
of presentation of proof.' 5 The problem of oppression and state coercion
pervades criminal justice. For instance, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
protect the individual from the potential oppression of the state
apparatus by requiring that the government meet its burden without
relying upon the defendant for proof. One variation on this theme is the
desire to discourage one party from free riding on the work or labor of
another.
Second generation evidence renders these concerns particularly
acute. Indeed, the peculiar qualities of this kind of evidence, when
compared to their first generation counterparts or other forms of
evidentiary proof, distinctly advantage the government against the
defense. The intellectual, tangible, and financial resources required to
thoroughly appraise second generation evidence are particularly
available to the government, and in turn are difficult for the defense to
attain.
First, appraisals of second generation proof entail access to
intellectual resources. Again, unlike the witness on the street or even a
rudimentary form of forensic evidence, analysis of a second generation• 26
technology demands technical knowledge and expertise. To verify or
probe such evidence typically requires specialized knowledge and skills
beyond that required of the average attorney. But whereas the
government has the entire apparatus of the forensic laboratory system at
its disposal to conduct further testing or answer the prosecutor's
is "peculiarly" within its knowledge, but that burden of proof should always rest with prosecution).
125. Id. at 591; Vivian Deborah Wilson, Shifting Burdens in Criminal Law: A Burden on Due
Process, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 731, 732 (I98i).
126. Murphy, supra note 3, at 727.
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questions, the defense must content itself with whatever independent
intellectual resources it can access.'27 Absent those resources, which
frequently are both fewer in number and greater in expense as compared
to the government,"' the evidence remains impenetrable.'29
Second, assessing second generation evidence demands access to no
small measure of tangible resources. As has previously been observed,
second generation techniques are characterized in part by their
mechanical sophistication and database dependency. They also
frequently implicate important issues of privacy and the protection of
proprietary information. These qualities compound the general problem
of resource inequity in the criminal justice system. A defendant may not
be able to pursue a claim or prove a point for no other reason than that
she lacks access to the physical equipment-say, a computer database or
set of proprietary documents. Indeed, the defendant may be unaware
that such items even exist.
Thirdly, second generation forensic evidence requires financial
resources. Although all forms of criminal investigation have the potential
to drain a defense attorney's coffers, enlisting the kind of experts and
equipment necessary to investigate second generation evidence is
particularly draining.'30 Buying the time of a highly educated, technically
sophisticated expert is expensive; access to proprietary technologies may
be difficult; and the operation of equipment may be costly. These high
costs may in turn decrease the likelihood that access to such expertise
will be subsidized by the state for an indigent defendant, and so attorneys
may wisely elect to spend their time on other aspects of the case rather
than pursue efforts to secure funding that is unlikely to be forthcoming. '
In sum, the intellectual, tangible, and financial resource disparities
between prosecution and defense with regard to second generation
evidence underscore the need to fortify the values of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. If the government cannot take the shortcut of proving its
case against the defendant by arguing failure to prove innocence, then
surely it should not be permitted to take the same shortcut by arguing
127. Id. at 745.
128. Id. at 749-51 , 753-56.
129. Cf. State v. Ashby, 567 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1997) (holding that while government's
comment on defendant's failure to do DNA testing did not constitute impermissible burden shifting, it
was nevertheless error because no evidence had been introduced to show that the defendant was even
aware that such tests were possible).
130. Murphy, supra note 3, at 749-51,753-56.
131. Cf Benson v. State, 636 A.2d 9o7, 911 (Del. 1994) (rejecting burden-shifting claim despite
defendant's argument that as an indigent previously denied funds for trial transcripts, a request for
expert funds would have been futile and holding that "when an indigent defendant fails to make an
application for state funds, regardless of the perceived likelihood of approval of the application, the
defendant is barred from asserting that an expert witness is unavailable for purposes of preventing
prosecutorial comment on the defense's failure to call an expert witness").
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guilt inferences based on failure to undertake certain investigative
approaches. This is particularly true where such approaches-namely,
second generation forensic testing-likely represent a far greater strain
on defense intellectual, tangible, and physical resources than more
mundane forms of investigation. Courts should hesitate before allowing
the government to exploit this disparity-whether by permitting
appropriation of defense experts or comment and argument related to
the defense's failure to present a retained expert or to retain an expert at
all.
C. TRUTH SEEKING AND THE PRESERVATION OF A MARGIN OF ERROR IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENSE
Another value broadly enshrined in the rights to counsel, silence,
confidential communication, and the presumption of innocence is that of
truth seeking and the inevitability of a margin of error in all decision-
making systems.'32 Each of these constitutional entitlements pays fealty
to the notion that it is better to err on the side of acquittal over
conviction, and that the best mechanism for ascertaining truth is to
require the government to seek reliable extrinsic evidence of the
defendant's guilt.'33
The paramount importance of an exceptional safeguard against
wrongful conviction particularly arises with respect to cases involving
second generation forensic evidence because such evidence may
constitute the strongest evidence-or even the only evidence-of guilt in
the case. The investigative capacity of second generation techniques
means that they can isolate and identify a suspect proactively,'34 and
courts have approved convictions based only on forensic evidence as
well.'35
In light of the potency and singularity of second generation forensic
proof, it is far too threatening to the delicate balance of interests to allow
the government to bolster its use of such evidence by appropriating a
nontestifying defense expert or by making arguments based on the
failure of the defense to either call or consult an expert. A jury in such a
situation might already be little disposed, due to the complexity and
technical nature of second generation evidence, to undertake the kind of
132. This subsection might be amplified by a section related to pragmatic concerns such as juror
confusion or usurpation of the jury role, but because those are less structural in nature-and might be
effectively managed through proper instructions -I set them aside for now.
133. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); WILLIAMS, supra note 524, at 871
("The philosophy underlying the rule is the oft-quoted maxim that it is better that ten guilty persons
should escape than one innocent suffer."); Wilson, supra note 125, at 731-32 (remarking that the
presumption of innocence and allocation of the burden to the government "creates an inevitable
margin of error" in favor of the defense).
134. Murphy, supra note 3, at 738-44.
135. Id. at 742-43.
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searching examination that should be the standard in every case. To
permit the government to effectively usurp any adverse defense claims
by proffering such inferences creates too great a temptation to the jury to
abdicate its fact-finding responsibility altogether.'36
Indeed, incursions on this truth-seeking function of the adversarial
system may be additionally troubling to the extent that we rely on
adversarial processes to uncover defects in evidence. In the case of
second generation sciences, independent analysis or testing may be hard
enough to come by due to the paucity of experts or the high cost and
complexity of the techniques.'37 But such testing is far less likely to occur
if the defense knows that if the defense consultation ends up confirming
the government's conclusions, a later argument at trial will be fatal to
success.
Indeed, it is the innocent defendant who, when confronted with
forensic evidence that the government claims inculpates him, might seem
most inclined to seek a test.
But that innocent defendant would be most likely to be dissuaded
from such testing in a regime that allows inferences of guilt from failures
to follow up. Unaware of how the government's testing could falsely
point in their direction (imagine it turns out from contamination) such a
defendant will be least inclined to roll the dice that whatever went wrong
for the government would not for them go wrong for them again, and
thereby effectively condemn them.
For example, imagine a sixty-year-old retiree and upstanding
member of a community, married for thirty-five years and the father of
two. His DNA is held in a national database as a result of a conviction
for writing bad checks ten years earlier. One day, the police knock on his
door and arrest him for a murder that occurred forty years in the past.
The only evidence against him is DNA tests that revealed that the
retiree's profile matched one retrieved from pantyhose used to strangle a
homicide victim; the DNA sample is not semen or blood, but cells
believed to have come from skin, sweat, or saliva. Another swabbing,
taken from a blood sample found on the victim's hand, is determined to
match an individual only four years old at the time of the murder and
believed to have nothing to do with the case. Analysts provide no
explanation for the second match, but the defense learns that the then-
four-year-old's DNA was processed at the lab on the same day as the
questioned samples.' 38
136. Cf Underwood, supra note 1i8, at 1332-33.
137. Murphy, supra note 3, at 753-56.
t38. These facts are a very loose approximation of the Gary Leiterman case. See Gail Zimmerman,
Deadly Ride: After 30 Years, a Suspect Is Charged in Co-Ed's Murder, CBSNEws.coM, Mar. 24, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo5/11/22/48hours/mainio66o64.shtml.
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Now imagine the retiree is innocent. And that his lawyer does not
know much about DNA evidence. Surely the attorney should retain an
expert to explain the evidence, and to point out any weaknesses or lines
of attack. Indeed, given the unexplained presence of a clearly innocent
third party, an attorney would be unethical in failing to seek assistance.
But in a jurisdiction that allows appropriation, missing evidence, or
concession arguments, the strategic calculation is less clear.'39 The
attorney already has at least one line of effective cross concerning the
unexplained DNA: the unexplained presence of the four-year-old. And if
the DNA is the only evidence against the defendant, then the strength of
the defense's challenge will be the difference between freedom and false
conviction. Why put that at risk by seeking advice that might ultimately
affirm the government's conclusion, when those efforts that could then
be appropriated by the government in a manner averse to the client's
interest? Of course, in a jurisdiction that allows both missing evidence
arguments, the lawyer is cursed if she seeks assistance (since the
government can point out that an expert was consulted but never heard
from) and cursed if she does not (since then the government can claim
that the failure to seek assistance suggests the defendant concedes its
futility). Permitting either kind of argument serves to penalize precisely
those persons-the innocents who do not know why or how a scientific
test identified them as the culprit-most in need of protection.
In sum, it is the duty of the defense to call the government's
evidence into question such that the government's burden cannot be met.
That duty may be difficult to meet absent an affirmative case to bolster
the defense position, but the law should not place the additional hurdle
of requiring the defense to supply explanations for why-in the course of
adducing its arguments to create a reasonable doubt-the defense
pursued one line of investigation or another. Although it is of course true
that the strongest case may be one in which the defense can offer an
explanation for what otherwise seems to be damning evidence, "° the
adversarial system permits acquittal based only on a jury's belief that the
evidence was insufficient, without the further requirement that they
understand why the government's proof was lacking. This reality is the
margin between the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; conviction in our system explicitly rejects the notion
139. Indeed, the very ambiguity of the evidentiary consequences of seeking independent testing
make the defense attorney's position untenable. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli et al., Defense Tactics for
DNA Litigation, PROFILES DNA, Jan. 1999, at so, Io-ii (observing that defense attorneys face "a
difficult choice-forgo DNA testing, and risk the conviction of an innocent person, or request such
testing and possibly aid the conviction of the lawyer's own client" (quoting HARLAN LEvy, AND THE
BLOOD CRIED Our: A PROSECUTOR'S SPELLBINDING AccOuNT OF THE POWER OF DNA 196 (1996))).
140. See Underwood, supra note 118, at 1337-38 (noting that improbable claims will likely make
the "factfinder... quite properly skeptical").
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that evidence in equipoise falls against the defendant's interest.'4'
Accordingly, permitting arguments of this kind bestows upon an
innocent defendant not just the task of refuting the strengths of the
government's evidence, but also the additional burden of explaining how
it came to be so compelling in the first place.
42
The high standard and extreme burden of proof in the criminal
justice systems-perhaps unreasonably and irrationally so to the lay
person's mind-in fact generate confidence that the guilty label is always
properly affixed.' 43 Despite the temptation to permit the government
extra latitude when the defense fails to call or retain an expert but
nonetheless attacks the evidence, the use of defendants' efforts to
investigate against them-while arguably persuasive in a single case-
ultimately threatens to nudge the integrity of the entire system into
disrepute.
D. AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY OF THE DEFENDANT
Lastly, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections also aim to
vouchsafe the individual autonomy and dignity of the defendant. Of
course, this value is embodied most clearly in the Fifth Amendment right
to silence, but it also finds expression in the rights to counsel and to put
the government to its proof.'"
The methodological robustness of second generation sciences stages
a difficult confrontation between the truth seeking function and a
defendant's dignitary interests. Second generation sciences are
remarkably seductive in their probity and in their promise of objective
truth. A DNA test itself appears irresistibly certain; when the DNA
profile is run in a database and a matching suspect turns up, it is almost
141. Damaska, supra note 117, at 34; Underwood, supra note i is, at 1306-o7. It might additionally
be observed that such arguments further threaten to muddle and confuse the jury by demanding a
degree of legal sophistication that is unrealistic to expect. Cf. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 265-66
(Fla. 1995) (rejecting argument that government may say defense has no obligation to test but does
have "opportunity" to test, because "we are unwilling to assume that the jury could have found a
measurable distinction between the terms").
142. Cf. Underwood, supra note I8, at 1338 (noting that with regard to burden shifting for other
kinds of improbable claims, such a rule would lead to double counting of the improbability).
143. Of course, second generation sciences like DNA typing have done much to call this
assumption into question through the numerous exoneration cases as well. Murphy, supra note 3, at
724.
144. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (commenting that "our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality" reflects one of the values animating the
privilege); W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND FACT WITH THE THEORY AND RULES
OF PRESUMPTIVE OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES 16I (1845) ("No one . . . is to be
required to explain or contradict, until enough has been proved to warrant a reasonable and just
conclusion against him .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court's path toward
establishing the Miranda rule for interrogation famously tarried through the right to counsel, see
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and the opinion itself, sounds largely in dignitary terms, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,433-34 (1966).
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as though the pristine hand of science had itself marked the defendant
guilty. In the face of such evidence, it is not hard to imagine why judges
bristle at a defendant's argument that a DNA test might be faulty, or why
the prosecutor instinctively feels compelled to argue that a truly innocent
defendant would have tested the evidence and presented a favorable
result.
Of course, the seductions of scientific methods of proof are nothing
new, nor are their conflicts with human dignitary values. Fingerprints,
photographs, and other first generation technologies also dazzled and
mesmerized judges, prosecutors, and juries, who all too often succumbed
to the temptation to view such "science" as infallible.'45 Second
generation technologies, in this respect, are simply all the more alluring:
they are methodologically robust, mechanically sophisticated, and
proactive in nature. The now familiar doubts about the reliability of first
generation techniques, or the dubious simplicity with which they were
developed, or the questionable existence of bias in examination, tend to
be altogether absent. Rather than an ordinary police officer coming into
court to testify that the individual witnesses picked as the perpetrator has
shoes that leave prints exactly like the ones left at the scene, a lab analyst
takes the stand and describes in highly sophisticated terms the scientific
processes that led to the identification of the defendant as a suspect
twenty years after the crime occurred.
But of course, mistakes do occur-even with robust technologies
like those of the second generation, and thus care should be taken not to
bend the rules of evidence to skirt the core values embodied by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. Second generation sciences, for all their dazzle,
are nonetheless subject to the same problems of bias, error,
contamination, and inaccuracy as their first generation counterparts, or
any form of admissible evidence. 46 Many of them also require a
significant amount of subjective decision making; even DNA typing-the
archetypal objective science-requires an analyst to make judgment calls
separating signal from noise.'47 Just because a discipline is founded in
scientific principle does not mean that it always yields wholly
145. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Revisiting Dreyfus: A More Complete Account of a Trial by Mathematics,
91 MINN. L. REV. 825 (2007) (using the Dreyfus case to explore the ongoing struggle to fix the proper
place for probability evidence in the courtroom); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age
of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) (detailing the history of acceptance of fingerprint
evidence, emphasizing its mesmerizing effects); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth:
Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 1O YALE J.L. & HUMAN. I (1998) (recounting
evolution in receptiveness to photographic evidence); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. I329, I344-50 (I) (enumerating
objections to the notion of using probability evidence to convict).
146. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3. at 772-74 (listing scandals).
147. See Erin Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson's Guide to the Inherent
Subjectivity in DNA Typing, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
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determinate answers: there is meteorology and there is math.
The commitment to the rigor of the adversary system, and resistance
to the beguiling shortcut of trial by science, ensures a payoff larger than
simply loyalty to some abstract ideals: it manifestly safeguards the
reliability of the evidence presented therein. At the same time, the
commitment to the symbolic function of criminal adjudication enshrined
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should not be too readily
discarded. '
CONCLUSION
In sum, it is evident that a range of cases have already emerged in
which the existence of second generation scientific evidence -typically
DNA-prompts the government to make moves and arguments that
would be impermissible were the evidence different. such cases will likely
only increase as the criminal justice system increasingly has at its
disposable highly reliable, scientifically sophisticated technologies that
extend irresistible invitations to definitively "know the truth." As courts
grapple with appropriation of defense experts, missing witness, and
concession of guilt issues, it would behoove them to think of the
particular characteristics of second generation forensic evidence. Those
characteristics reveal both the shallow seductiveness of permitting such
arguments without restraint, as well as the profound disregard of the
values enshrined in our evidentiary and constitutional rules that allowing
such arguments represents. Although scientific proof has long tempted
the criminal justice system, the underlying values animating the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights threatened by such arguments should ultimately
reveal its alluring ease to be a mirage, and the shoring up of the
robustness of the adversary system as really the true opportunity for
truth.
148. Underwood, supra note i i8, at 1307.
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